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Chapter Two 
The Theological Origins ol Engineering 
BRAD J. KALLENBERG 
Knowledge of our roots can sometimes help us figure out how we 
ought to proceed. Many claim that engineering began in ancient an-
tiquity with the Egyptian pyramids, Archimedes' inventions, or the 
Roman aqueducts. Others give contemporary engineering a more re-
cent history, tracing its origins to the Industrial Revolution or the En-
lightenment. Yet what is often overlooked is the fact that contemporary 
engineering owes part of its identity to medieval monasticism. The ad-
vantage of remembering this history is the bearing it has on the ques-
tions "What is engineering for?" and "How ought engineering be 
practiced?" 
Michael Davis makes the claim that, in Western thought, engineer-
ing has always played second fiddle to science because we in the West 
have been bewitched by the myth that engineering is nothing but ap-
plied science. But engineering is not merely applied science. Engineer-
ing has its own distinctive identity. In the first place, Davis claims that 
engineering can be distinguished from science by the sheer magnitude 
of the projects undertaken. Constructing a bridge, building a dam, 
raising a skyscraper are all tasks that require a great deal of coopera-
tion, the sort of cooperation with which the lone inventor or isolated 
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research scientist may have little experience. Of course, if Hobbes is 
to be believed about the unstable nature of society, the only body ca-
pable of the organization and coercive leadership necessary for such 
large-scale cooperation is the military. Consequently, Davis traces the 
origins of modern engineering to the seventeenth century, when France 
boasted an army of 300,000 foot soldiers. For the first time in Euro-
pean history, those foot soldiers who operated the big weapons became 
organized into a special unit-the corps du genie-a term that connotes 
both the "engines" of war and the "genie" or magic associated with 
their function.1 
Although the seventeenth-century corps members are probably 
best thought of as proto-engineers, the officers of this unit (offi.cieurs 
du genie) began to undergo a formal training (in mathematics, technol-
ogy, and officer training) whose curriculum differs only slightly from 
that of today's schools of engineering.2 Thus what had begun as Ecole 
des Travaux Public (the School of Public Works), by 1794 became 
Ecole Polytechnique. This institution is still in operation and its curri-
cula became the model for the first school of engineering in the Ameri-
cas, namely, the US Military Academy at West Point. 
In a moment I will explain why I think Davis's account is incom-
plete, if not downright wrong. Yet there is much to be said for it. Who 
could disagree that warcraft was the soil in which even the smallest 
technological advance blossomed with importance to the end that each 
was coopted for military use? Famously, the invention of the stirrup 
secured the superiority of the Frankish cavalry over their more loosely 
seated opponents in the eighth century just as the development of a 
better trigger enabled William the Conqueror to utilize crossbows to 
overpower his Norman opponents in the eleventh.3 
Moreover, engineering has a distinctive domain of knowledge. As 
is often the case, with specialization comes a sort of tunnel vision. Per-
haps this helps to explain the enduring tendency of engineers to be 
more enamored with "engineering as an end in itself rather than as 
a means to satisfying human need." 4 On the one hand, if engineers 
are descendants of military officers, then they have been trained and 
bound to do as they are commanded. On the other hand, each genera-
tion of engineers is entrusted with a growing and specialized body of 
knowledge the mastery of which requires successively greater and 
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greater amounts of time and attention. Consequently, it is not surpris-
ing that engineers today are easily caricatured as task-oriented folk 
who are more apt to keep their noses to the grindstone than to trouble 
with the "why?" questions that seem to lie outside the purvey of engi-
neering itself. 
Many (and I among them) feel that the tunnel vision, which is so 
stereotypical of contemporary engineering, points to a lamentable fail-
ing. If "doing one's job" does not automatically indemnify soldiers act-
ing under orders, why should engineers be excused from making ethics 
or economics or politics their business? While Davis concedes that this 
tendency may appear troubling, he explains that treating engineering 
as an end in itself is not identical to tunnel vision and therefore not 
necessarily a bad thing (though it may be). Although engineering was 
conceived and birthed by the military, he argues, it matured during the 
Age of Enlightenment, a time rife with the optimism that scientific 
learning in every form "would bring peace, prosperity, and continuous 
improvement."5 The conclusion Davis wants his readers to draw is that 
engineers may be somewhat justified in their narrow preoccupation 
with technical brilliance because the enterprise by its very nature as 
an offspring of the Enlightenment cannot but serve human need and 
improve society. Therefore, the concentration with which engineers 
treat engineering as end in itself in lieu of attention to broader social 
issues need not tarnish the image of engineering as a morally oriented 
enterprise. 
Davis does have a point. Engineering has an excellent track record 
in the service of human need. And in large measure, this track record 
functions as a gyroscope that helps engineering stay on course de-
spite the tangential impetuses of governmental agendas and business 
"needs." However, I am not convinced that this gyroscope, while abso-
lutely necessary to the continued flourishing of technical expertise, is a 
sufficient condition for engineering as a whole to maintain its moral 
bearings. There is a latent ambiguity in engineering's self-understanding. 
If human life is for increasing market share in a capitalist economy, 
then designed obsolescence is a reasonable engineering strategy. If 
human life is for protecting the security of one's people against others, 
then engineering's four-hundred-year-long allegiance to the military 
is entirely appropriate. The question, "What is human life for?" has 
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enormous bearing on the practice of engineering.6 Therefore, engineers 
may benefit from an account of engineering history that is already 
steeped in an account of what human life is for. 
The story I wish to narrate takes us back to the twelfth-century 
monastery of St. Victor in Paris. I will argue that what they called "me-
chanical arts" is a forerunner of what we today call "engineering." Cen-
tral for my purposes is the Didascalicon, written in the 1120s by Hugh 
of St. Victor. It not only exemplifies a theological model for under-
standing the identity of engineering, it has bearing on how engineering 
ought to be practiced. 
It is not altogether clear when in history "mechanical arts" be-
comes recognizable as proto-engineering or when engineers success-
fully shed their longstanding class stigma. The earlier one looks in 
ancient history, the more disparaging is the view toward mechanical 
things. Archimedes (d. 212 BCE) may have saved Athens with his con-
traptions, but as Plutarch explains, he did so shamefully, fully aware of 
Plato's "indignation at [mechanical arts], and his invectives against it as 
the mere corruption and annihilation of the one good geometry. "7 Like-
wise Plato's contemporary, Xenophon (d. 354 BCE) makes it clear that 
no true gentleman practiced "mechanical arts ." Xenophon reports Soc-
rates' exclamation: 
[N]ot only are the arts which we call mechanical [banausikai] gen-
erally held in bad repute, but States also have a very low opinion of 
them,-and with justice. For they are injurious to the bodily health 
of workmen and overseers, in that they compel them to be seated 
and indoors, and in some cases also all day before a fire, and when 
the body grows effeminate, the mind also becomes weaker and 
weaker. And the mechanical arts, as they are called, will not let 
men unite with them care for friends and State, so that men en-
gaged in them must ever appear to be both bad friends and poor 
defenders of their country. And there are States ... in which not a 
single citizen is allowed to engage in mechanical arts [banausikas 
technas ].8 
Mechanical arts, in other words, were for slaves. 
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But what activities fall under the domain of "mechanical arts"? As 
indicated by Xenophon's words, the mechanics (banausous) spent a 
large part of the day at the foundry (baunos was the forge, or furnace). 
So smithing is implicated as undignified. But evidently warcraft is not. 
Nor is agriculture. Socrates goes on to assert that these latter activities 
are for gentlemen. 
At first blush, Aristotle's three-fold division of the rational soul 
into theoretical, practical, and productive reasoning holds more prom-
ise for elevating the status of manual crafts. But Aristotle (d. 322 BCE) 
could not resist falling prey to the hierarchy of the disciplines that gives 
wisdom (sophia) clear priority over intelligence (phronesis) and intel-
ligence explicit reign over craftsmanship (techne-as in "technology"). 
To make matters worse, Aristotle also perpetuated the pejorative sense 
of "mechanical" (bana.usous). So uncontestable is the slur against all 
things mechanical that in the Nicomachean Ethics it is simply translated 
as "vulgar"! 9 Similarly, in the Politics he writes that 
any occupation, art, or science, which makes the body or soul or 
mind of the freeman less fit for the practice or exercise of excel-
lence, is mechanical; wherefore we call those arts mechanical 
which tend to deform the body, and likewise all paid employments, 
for they absorb and degrade the mind. 10 
If we leap ahead eight centuries to the close of Plato's Academy-
simultaneous with the founding of the Order of the Benedictines in 
524 CE-we will discover that among intellectuals not much has 
changed. Consider Boethius (d. 524 CE), arguably the most significant 
philosopher-theologian between Augustine of Hippo (d. 430 CE) and 
Thomas Aquinas (d. 1274 CE). He divides the love of wisdom (philoso-
phia.) into two disciplines only, theoretical and practical, entirely ne-
glecting to mention productive (mechanical) arts. When Isidore of 
Seville (d. 636 CE) compiles his encyclopedia a generation later, he 
acknowledges a number of disciplines that lie outside the classic seven 
that constitute liberal artsY 
Most striking is the inclusion of mineralogy alongside the emi-
nently reputable enterprises of medicine and agriculture. But unfortu-
nately, Isidore did little to improve the social standing of the mechanical 
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arts. His fascination with etymology led him to mistake the Latin me-
chanicus as derived from the Greek moichos, meaning "adulterer" rather 
than from mechane (machine) and mechos (a means, something ex-
pedient, a remedy). To his credit, there is some plausibility for this 
mistake. Martin of Laon (d. 680 CE) takes Isidore to mean that the 
ingenuity of a mechanism was akin to the secret doings of an illicit 
sexual affair: 
from "moechus" we call "mechanical art" any object which is 
clever and most delicate and which, in its making or operation, is 
beyond detection, so that beholders find their power stolen from 
them when they cannot penetrate the ingenuity of the thing. 12 
But of course Isidore's genealogy could not help but accentuate the 
stigma that afflicted artisans and remind them of their proper place 
at the bottom of the feeding chain. Perhaps this stigma explains why 
the Cistercian Order (founded 1098 CE) explicitly forbade "profane" 
learning and aimed to "make of every monastery a 'school of charity' 
only." 13 Human life was for the love of God and neighbor, but evidently 
mechanical arts lay outside the pale of such love. 
The situation would change in the twelfth century. Hugh of St. Vic-
tor (d. 1142 CE) presents the first cogent challenge to the mechinists' 
stigma by offering a theological account of the practice of mechanical 
arts. Granted, Hugh's account was not without rivals: his contempo-
rary, William of Conches (d. 1154 CE), disdained the mechanical arts 
as merely menial. 14 The difference between Hugh and William lay in 
their starting points. While William began anthropologically with 
human knowledge (scientia), Hugh began theologically with the doc-
trine of "sin." 
The ancient Greeks explained evil in the world as the residual ef-
fect of an eternal battle between the powers of good and evil. Evil was 
not only conceived as a something, it was an eternal something. Thus, 
in the beginning was chaos. But Augustine, writing a millennium after 
Homer and clearly Hugh's hero, could not dignify evil with substance, 
much less with eternality, for as scripture spelled out, "in the begin-
ning, God .... " In other words, in order to affirm monotheism, Augus-
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tine was bound to describe evil as having a temporal beginning. And, 
in order to avoid the conclusion that God created evil, Augustine in-
sisted evil wasn't a substance, but an absence; evil was a defect that 
entered the picture some time after God had created an entirely good 
world. 
Whence evil? Evil was a distortion in the order of creation effected 
by a misuse of creaturely freedom. How so? In order for creation to be 
a uni-verse (rather than a multi-verse), creation embodied a single 
hierarchy of value. 15 The human soul operates correctly when it as-
cribes that quality of love appropriate to the object in light of its place 
on the hierarchy. Augustine (following Plato) considered the order it-
self every bit as real as the tangible objects that populated the hierarchy 
of the created world. Evil entered when human beings re-ranked the 
hierarchy of creation, ascribing an inordinate quantity oflove to one or 
more of the rungs of the hierarchy. In the Apostle Paul's words, "For 
they exchanged the truth of God for a lie, and worshiped and served 
the creature rather than the Creator, who is blessed forever. "16 In es-
sence, human mis-valuing was a distortion of the order of creation. The 
change was very real, although it was a distortion they bore within 
themselves , for a disordered love is a disordered soul. Thus, disordered 
human love manifests itself sometimes as greed, other times as jeal-
ousy, covetousness, pride, and so on. This condition had the unpleas-
ant consequence of being perpetual, because one could only make 
moral progress if one possessed a faculty for indexing the progress 
made. And it was this very faculty, namely love of the Good, that could 
not be trusted. 
But the bad news does not stop with human depravity. Once human 
beings, viceroys of creation, became incapable of rescuing themselves 
(non posse non peccare, not able not to sin), the creation they were sup-
posed to tend fell under a curse. Christian scripture aptly expresses its 
undeniable reality: 
For the anxious longing of the creation waits eagerly for the reveal-
ing of the sons of God. For the creation was subjected to futility ... 
in hope that the creation itself also will be set free from its slavery 
to corruption into the freedom of the glory of the children of God. 
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For we know that the whole creation groans and suffers the pains 
of childbirth together until now. 17 
Whether we call this curse "sin" or "entropy" makes little differ-
ence for my argument. The fact of the matter is: iron rusts, people 
sicken and die, and things fall apart. 
This then is the theological view of human existence that Hugh 
inherits from Augustine. As fallen creatures, human beings have for-
gotten who they are and whose they are. Nevertheless, Hugh writes, 
"we are restored through instruction, so that we may recognize our 
nature." 18 God in his redemptive grace and wisdom has intended the 
very condition of human fallenness as the impetus for human pursuit 
of Wisdom, a quest which is the "highest curative in life." 
And so arose the pursuit of that Wisdom we are required to seek-
a pursuit called "philosophy"-so that knowledge of truth might 
enlighten our ignorance, so that love of virtue might do away with 
wicked desire, and so that the quest for necessary conveniences 
might alleviate our weaknesses. These three pursuits first com-
prised philosophy. The one which sought truth was called theo-
retical; the one which furthered virtue men were pleased to call 
ethics; the one devised to seek conveniences custom called me-
chanical. 19 
In this passage Hugh asserts that the redemption of the soul is as-
sisted by the practice of "arts" that correspond with all the powers of 
the soul. Corresponding to the understanding (intelligentia) are both 
the theoretical arts (that is, the contemplation of necessary truths; here 
Hugh intends theology, physics, and mathematics) and the practical 
arts (namely, the practice of morality and the cultivation of virtue). 
Corresponding to knowledge (scientia) are all the mechanical arts. 
These latter have to do with feeding, fortifying the body against harm, 
and the contrivance of "remedies" for alleviating physical weakness 
(1.8, p. 55). 
Hugh's account is a "nouveau explicitement," a brand new way of 
thinking.20 By paying more attention to the doctrine of the human fall 
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into sin, Hugh is able to move beyond his forebears (such as Boethius) 
and include mechanical arts under God's plan of redemption. Me-
chanical arts have to do with countering the effects of the curse, just as 
theoretical and practical arts have to do with countering the effects of 
human depravity, through the knowing and following of a gracious 
God on a redemptive path. 
Hugh's inclusion of the mechanical rts is no small feat, for "me-
chanical arts" by his day had evolved into a very broad category. To be 
specific, mechanical arts was comprised of seven classes of practices: 
fabric-making, armament, commerce, agriculture, hunting, medicine, 
and theatricsY These seven name families of practices. For example, 
"hunting ... includes all the duties of bakers, butcher, cooks, and tav-
ern keepers," as well as those who actually do the gaming, fowling and 
fishing (II.25, pp. 77-78). And "armament" included material science, 
even metallurgy: "To this science belong all such materials as stones, 
woods, metals , sands, and clays" (11.22, p. 76). With this last move 
Hugh has managed to embrace even the grimy-faced smithy so consis-
tently maligned for sixteen centuries. 
Though fiercely loyal to Augustinian theology, Hugh parts com-
pany with Augustine's Platonic division of human arts into physics, 
ethics, and logic, opting instead for Aristotle's quaternary of theoretical, 
practical, productive, and logical disciplines. Under Hugh's hand, "pro-
ductive" arts expands to include all mechanical arts known to him and 
"logic" alone becomes the special domain of philosophy that governs 
the consistency within each art and between all the arts. 
Hugh argues that, as a theologically legitimate enterprise, me-
chanical arts were governed by logic every bit as much as were theo-
retical and practical arts. This means that mechanical arts can be 
evaluated for how well they aimed at the human Good. Since Hugh 
could not conceive of any human Good other than that revealed by the 
divine Wisdom, all of the mechanical arts aim at redemptive love. To 
cite one example of this redemptive vision at work, Hugh asserts "com-
merce" as the mechanical art that aims at reconciliation of strangers: 
"The pursuit of commerce reconciles nations, calms wars, strengthens 
peace, and commutes the private good of individuals into the common 
benefit of all" (II.23, p.77). 
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In Hugh's mind theology and mechanical arts are mutually sup-
portive. The ends of mechanical arts are displayed by the physical 
things contrived by the artificer. As these ends are theological in nature 
(they aim at the Good revealed by God), mechanical arts benefit theol-
ogy by rendering visible invisible things. A bridge is not merely a con-
venience, it is also a means of cultivating friendship between rival 
villages on opposing banks. Theology in turn benefits mechanical arts 
by providing a benchmark for assessing the aptness of its aims. But 
Hugh is quick to caution against mistaking worldly theology (a theol-
ogy that moves from human experience to the knowledge of God) for 
graced theology (a theology that moves from knowledge of God to 
human experience). In his Exposition of the Heavenly Hierarchy, Hugh 
writes: 
Invisible things can only be made known by visible things , and 
therefore the whole of theology must use visible demonstrations. 
But worldly theology adopted the works of creation and the ele-
ments of this world that it might make its demonstration in 
these .. . . And for this reason, namely, because it used a demon-
stration which revealed little, it lacked ability to bring forth the 
incomprehensible truth without stain of error .... In this were the 
wise men of this world fools, namely, that proceeding by natural 
evidences alone and following the elements and appearances of the 
world, they lacked the lessons of grace. 22 
What are these lessons of grace? For Hugh grace is not something 
added on top of nature, but something that permeates the world and 
with which human beings may keep step. "Grace," writes Hugh, is the 
powerful medicine perpetually offered by God "to illuminate the blind 
and to cure the weak; to illuminate ignorance, to cool concupiscence; 
to illuminate unto knowledge of truth; to inflame unto love of vir-
tue. "23 ln contrast, worldly theology is like tugging at one's bootstraps. 
It reveals little, and therefore has little to say to mechanical arts, pre-
cisely because it ignores God at the outset. Worldly theology begins 
with an empirical study of "pure nature" and then attempts to reason 
up toward the possible existence of a divine realm. But graced theology 
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unblinkingly assumes that creation is already shot through with the 
presence of God. Wherever one points is God's world. Human beings 
live as creatures under a creator whose divine wisdom is the archetypal 
exemplar of creation. 24 Granted, evil happens. But the undeniable fact 
of evil only serves to corroborate strongly the biblical story that human 
beings are fallen creatures inhabiting a cursed world. The Fall and its 
effects are universal in scope (how could it be otherwise?). Never-
theless, even in their fallenness, human beings are redeemable in the 
pursuit of divine wisdom by means of exercising theoretical, practical, 
and mechanical arts. The final end of mechanical arts is reunion with 
God through the pursuit of divine wisdom as well as the alleviation of 
physical weakness stemming from the cursedness of the created world. 
Three conclusions can be drawn from Hugh's Didascalicon. First, 
in Hugh's day the growth of technology was already noticeable enough 
to require a fresh classification long before the seventeenth century that 
figures so prominently in Davis's story of the identity of modern engi-
neering. 25 Second, Hugh's account shows that despite our penchant for 
separating engineering and theology, a theological account of the me-
chanical arts was possible. This is not to say his account is more per-
suasive than Davis's, only that engineering need not be excluded from 
a theological account of human life. 
The third conclusion to draw from the Didascalion is that, for a 
careful thinker such as Hugh, a theological account was the only ac-
count that was broad enough to encompass all he had learned from 
Plato (especially the Timaeus), Aristotle, Augustine, Boethius, Varro, 
Quintilian, Isidore, and others. His strategy was to absorb all the perti-
nent sources into a master theological narrative. We moderns tend to 
be suspicious of such a methodology. We are more accustomed to rec-
onciling diverse views (if they can be reconciled at all-and it has be-
come increasingly in vogue to assume an incommensurable plurality of 
views) by reducing all the views to their greatest common denomina-
tor. Of course such a reductive methodology means that those tenets 
distinctive to specific religions such as Christianity or Islam or Judaism 
must be surrendered in the name of peaceful coexistence with its rivals. 
But then what is left? The greatest common denominator, it would be 
argued five centuries later, was the notion of "pure nature." However, 
this notion was simply not available to Hugh for two reasons. 
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In the first place, as Henri de Lubac has convincingly argued, the 
perspective of present-day historiographers may be blurred by three 
hundred years of (Cartesian) dualism that wrongheadedly presupposes 
it even makes sense to speak of "pure nature." In this thoroughly secu-
larized vision, notions of "grace," "spirit," "calling," and the "super-
natural"-if they have substantive content at all-are concluded to be 
mere add-ons to a presumably more basic concept: "pure nature." But 
this could not have been the Christian outlook in its previous fifteen 
centuries. The creation of human beings in God's image had sweeping 
ramifications for understanding for what human life was intended. Me-
dieval Christians simply took it for granted that human beings were 
"destined to live eternally in God, to enter into the inner movement of 
the Trinitarian life and to bring all creation with [them]." 26 In other 
words, for medieval believers , "nature was made for the supernatural" 
and cannot even be conceived, much less explained, without itY The 
inseparability of natural and supernatural typified the medieval Chris-
tianity and is given its most eloquent expression by Augustine who 
included all creation in the "us" of the famous opening to his Confes-
sions: "You have made us for yourself, and our heart is restless until it 
rests in you." 
In the second place, until late in the seventeenth century, "natural 
philosophy" covered much of the same domain as "Christian theol-
ogy." It is a colossal misunderstanding to think natural philosophy 
studied "pure nature" while Christian theology studied a putative "su-
pernatural" realm. On the contrary, both disciplines were overlapping 
responses to the created world (and it was seen as creation, rather than 
something else).28 Historian of science Margaret Osler writes, 
Medieval natural philosophy was conditioned by theological pre-
suppositions, and its conclusions pertained to important theo-
logical issues. Discussions of the causes of things , for example, 
included questions about the cause of the world and revolved 
around the issues of the divine creation of the world. Discussions 
of matter and change had implications for the interpretation of the 
Eucharist. Discussions of the nature of animals and how they differ 
from humans had direct bearing on questions about the ilnmor-
tality of the human souP9 
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Osler's words point to the fact that medievals could not separate 
efficient and material causes from final causes in their explanations. 
Christian theology and natural philosophy had overlapping domains 
because in a created world both disciplines had the same final cause 
(namely; union with the creator God). It is only after the Enlighten-
ment project abandons Aristotle that subsequent moderns are tempted 
to read mere instrumentalism-efficient causes taken in isolation from 
final causes-back into medieval thought.30 
Perhaps an example can make this clearer. The requirement that 
monks devote themselves to work is widely acknowledged. What is 
contested today is whether the Benedictine motto, "work is prayer" 
(!abo rare est or are), originally reflected a sacramental rather than an 
instrumental view of work. For his part, historian jacques Le Goff 
maintains that monks worked hard, intentionally trying to improve 
their efficiency with machinery (such as the water-powered mill con-
structed at Saint Ursus at Loches in the sixth century) so as to free up 
time for the essential thing: opus Dei, namely contemplative prayer.31 In 
other words, Le Goff can see water mills for saving time but not for 
worship. Does Le Goff get history wrong? 
Le Goff's history is not so much wrong as it is monochromatic. 
Did water mills save time? Of course. But where Le Goff sees in black 
and white, Hugh sees in resplendent color. For Hugh, mechanical arts 
yielded artifacts (and processes) that were inherently sacramental be-
cause they rendered visible the end of mechanical reasoning, which 
in its exercise was simultaneously natural (namely, the alleviation of 
physical weakness) and supernatural (namely, the journeying toward 
reunion with divine wisdom). 
The strength of Hugh's theological account is that it supplies what 
nontheological (what Hugh called "worldly") accounts could not as 
easily do, namely, thick description of the final end toward which all 
human activity aims. In sum, it was by the "lessons of grace" that Hugh 
was able to see the physical world under both the aspect of the super-
natural and the aspect of the natural. Accordingly he described me-
chanical arts as guided by a dual encl. The supervening supernatural 
end is this: the exercise of mechanical reasoning is part of the journey 
toward reunion with God. The subvening natural end is this: mechani-
cal artifacts are for the alleviation of physical weakness that is the con-
sequence of living in a fallen world. 
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